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A QUESTION OF LOYALTY 
XUN YU, CAO CAO AND SIMA GUANG 
 
In 212 AD, as the army of the great warlord Cao Cao 曹操 was moving south 
against his southern rival Sun Quan 孫權, there was a sad incident in the 
camp. Xun Yu 荀彧, a leading counsellor and one of Cao Cao's oldest 
supporters, died at Shouchun 壽春 city on the Huai 淮 River. There are 
varying accounts and opinions whether he died of natural causes or whether 
he killed himself, but Cao Cao was embarrassed and Emperor Xian of Han 
漢獻帝, though close-held under his control, made a point of mourning Xun 
Yu. 
 Nine hundred years later, moreover, as Sima Guang 司馬光 of the 
Northern Song dynasty compiled his chronicle Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑, he 
took the death of Xun Yu as the occasion for a powerful essay on proper 
conduct in troubled times. 
 The story of Xun Yu and Cao Cao, therefore, not only touches the 
tensions of loyalty and legitimacy between a falling dynasty and a rising 
power, it provided one of China's greatest Confucianists with a case-study 
for his moral teaching.1 [31] 
For two and a half thousand years since the time of Confucius, as rival states 
and succeeding dynasties have ruled in China, many men in public affairs 
have been forced into cruel choices of allegiance, and have been expected to 
maintain personal honour even at the cost of their lives. 
 There has always been conflict in the Confucian tradition between an 
individual's responsibility to private personal and family affairs when they 
are set against public loyalty to the state and its government. It is not always 
certain whether a true gentleman should involve himself in official life, 
seeking to promote the common good, or whether he should abandon the 
corrupted field of politics and maintain his own morality. Should he indeed 
take a public role, then he must decide whether his concern for the state and 
people can express itself through loyalty to a single ruler or through an 
eclectic choice among the policies and persons suited to the time. 
 Before the unified empire was established by Qin 秦 and confirmed by 
Han 漢, scholars and statesman might offer their talents to one ruler or 
another, and each party engaged in a personal contract of grace and fidelity. 
So the disciples of Confucius served many different rulers, and Mencius, 
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born in the state of Zou 鄒, had no hesitation in offering his services to rival 
kings of Wei 魏 and Qi 齊. Neither place of birth nor [32] allegiance to a 
teacher hindered a man from choosing his political master; the only 
requirement was that he should serve with honour and maintain his own 
integrity. 
 From the time of Qin and Han, however, the ideal of a unified, civilised 
empire became dominant. For generations of gentlemen, loyalty and service 
were expressed simply through relationship to the emperor and his 
government – though that by itself could create desperate and often fatal 
conflicts of conscience. In times of division, on the other hand, as rival 
warlords struggled for sovereignty, each of their followers had to decide their 
own allegiance and, sometimes, the conditions under which they might 
legitimately change it. And there were occasions when the critical choice had 
to be made as one dynasty took over from another, not always by external 
force of arms but often by internal political manoeuvre and coup d'état. 
 Many men would be faced with such decisions. In the middle of the 
third century, as the fragile state of Wei 魏 ruled by the Cao 曹 family was 
subverted by the powerful Sima 司馬 clan and its gentry allies, the poet 
Ruan Ji 阮籍, caught between factions, expressed his bitterness in coded 
verse.2 In the disordered tenth century, the minister Feng Dao 馮道 served 
five dynasties and ten rulers, and was categorised as the most treacherous 
Confucian of them all.3 And in the seventeenth century, as the Ming 明 
dynasty collapsed and China was conquered by the Manchu Qing 清, 
questions of loyalty or acceptance [33] confused good men and remained to 
bedevil their successors.4 In each case, and in a multitude of others, later 
historians have offered moral judgements from the perspective of their own 
experience and concerns. 
 For any man of Confucian honour, there has always been tension 
between personal or family duty and loyalty to the state. Increasingly during 
Later Han, however, as the imperial government appeared dominated by 
eunuchs and factions at court, many gentlemen refused to become involved 
and gained honour from their insistence upon private life.5 Even among those 
who were willing to hold office, there appeared a sense of personal 
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responsibility to the individual one chose to serve under. Many men of good 
conduct abandoned the imperial service because they regarded their 
superiors as corrupt and unworthy, while the power and influence of high 
officials was enhanced by the support they could call upon from clients, 
students and former subordinates, sometimes numbered in the hundreds and 
thousands. By the latter part of the second century AD, the network of 
personal relationships, patronage and alliance between individuals and 
family groups, was generally more immediate and important than the 
general, almost anonymous, loyalty which every official was supposed to 
feel and express towards the imperial state and the people it ruled.6 [34] 
 Despite real tensions and sometimes fatal crises of politics at court, these 
matters of personal conscience appear almost as a luxury, encouraged by the 
sense of security which four hundred years of dynastic rule provided. The 
bonds of the state were loosened, however, by such individualistic morality, 
and at the end of the century, as the traditional structures of imperial 
government collapsed in ruins and were ground to pieces by civil war, far 
harsher questions were posed: how much did a man owe his patron and 
leader in war, how much to the broader common weal; and how could the 
demarcation be decided? As conflict spread across the empire, few could 
escape into private life, while for those at the centre of affairs the nature of 
public allegiance, and the form of state they should serve, were matters of 
cruel concern. 
 The morality of politics in peace-time had not prepared men well for the 
brutalities of a disintegrated empire and the harsh struggle to restore some 
semblance of order. And the brittle, ramshackle regimes of Cao Cao and his 
rival warlords made demands upon their subjects and servants which left 
small room for moral contradiction or uncertainty. 
 
The Xun clan of Yingchuan 
Xun Yu was born in 163 to a noted family of Yingyin 穎陰 county in 
Yingchuan 穎川 commandery, by Xuchang 許昌 in present-day Henan.7 East 
of the imperial capital at Luoyang 洛陽, Yingchuan was one of the most 
populous and prosperous territories of the Han empire, but the Xun [35] had 
come to prominence only in the time of Xun Yu's grandfather Xun Shu 荀淑, 
a local magnate with pretensions to scholarship and contacts in the central 
government. Xun Shu himself held no high office, but by the time Xun Yu 
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was born the family had acquired local respect and some position on the 
national stage. 
 A few years later, the situation changed. In 159 Emperor Huan 桓 of 
Han had overthrown his domineering brother-in-law the General-in-Chief 
Liang Ji 梁冀, and his personal government was strongly influenced by the 
court eunuchs who had aided him in the coup. There was increasing 
resistance amongst traditional gentlemen to these mutilated favourites, with 
accusations and impeachment on each side. In 167 there was a purge and 
proscription of the anti-eunuch "Pure" party, but Emperor Huan died at the 
end of that year and the youthful Emperor Ling 靈 began his reign under the 
control of Dou Wu 竇武, father of the regent Empress-Dowager and a 
sympathiser of the traditionalists. In the autumn of 168, however, the 
eunuchs arranged their own coup, Dou Wu was overthrown, and his leading 
associates were executed or proscribed from office.8 
 Some members of the Xun clan had held a leading role against the 
eunuchs; one was executed, and the family as a whole was excluded from the 
court and the capital. The eunuch regime, however, was resented in the 
provinces, and its opponents were admired for their courage and principle. 
Several of Xun Yu's kinsmen established a reputation for private scholarship, 
and his uncle Xun Shuang 爽, in exile and hiding, was celebrated for his 
moral commentaries on the Confucian classics. In 184, as the religious 
rebellion of the Yellow Turbans 黃巾 raised popular armies against the 
government, the quarrels between the factions took second place to the 
emergency: proscription and persecution were abandoned, and the gentry 
joined the imperial armies to defend the dynasty. [36] 
 Five years later, however, after the death of Emperor Ling in 189, the 
central government fell into ruins. He Jin 何進, brother of the new regent 
Empress-Dowager, planned to kill the eunuchs but was himself assassinated. 
His troops and associates then massacred their enemies, and in the disorder 
which followed the frontier general Dong Zhuo 董卓 seized power in the 
capital. Replacing Liu Bian 劉辯, son of the Lady He, with his half-brother 
Liu Xie 協, later known as Emperor Xian 獻, Dong Zhuo attempted to 
establish a government of reform. He was equipped for the task, however, 
neither by temperament nor legitimate authority. By 190 there was open 
rebellion in the east, and the empire was divided in civil war. 
 The Xun had been in no hurry to return to public life, and members of 
the family took differing paths. Xun Shuang served against the Yellow 
Turbans in 184, but initially rejected invitations to civil office. He later 
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accepted a summons from Dong Zhuo, became an Excellency, highest rank 
in the bureaucracy, and followed the court west to Chang'an 長安 where he 
died in 190 at the age of 62. He was accompanied by his nephew Yue 悅, 
who joined the Palace Library and was commissioned to compile the 
Chronicle of [Former] Han (漢紀 Han ji). Xun You 攸, a distant cousin who 
had joined He Jin in 189, also came to the capital; he plotted against Dong 
Zhuo and narrowly escaped execution. 
 Xun Yu's elder brother Shen 諶 had meantime taken service with Yuan 
Shao 袁紹, and in 191 he persuaded Han Fu 韓馥, Governor of Ji province 
冀州 on the great plain north of the Yellow River, to cede power to him. 
Yuan Shao was a member of a great official family and leader of the alliance 
against Dong Zhuo, and Xun Shen became one of his advisers. 
 Xun Yu had stayed in Yingchuan, but at this time, now almost thirty 
years old, he went to join his brother at Ye 鄴, the capital of Ji province. A 
short time later troops of Dong Zhuo attacked Yingchuan, several members 
of the family were killed, and their estates were ruined. From this time, like 
many other gentry embroiled in the civil [37] war, Xun Yu and his relatives 
were cast adrift from their former landed base and were obliged to rely upon 
their own wits and skill. 
 Though well received by Yuan Shao, Xun Yu soon left his service to go 
to Cao Cao. Cao Cao's father Cao Song 曹嵩 had been adopted by the 
eunuch Cao Teng 騰, held high office as an Excellency, and amassed great 
wealth. Cao Cao himself, after a middling career at the capital, fled Dong 
Zhuo's regime in 189, sold family property to raise troops in the southeast, 
and joined the alliance under Yuan Shao. Eight years the elder, Cao Cao had 
probably not met Xun Yu before, but the two men immediately found a 
rapport. 
 In 194, from his base in Yan 兗 province on the plain south of the 
Yellow River, Cao Cao attacked Xu 徐 province in the east to avenge the 
murder of his father. While he was away several of his officers mutinied and 
invited the fighting man Lü Bu 呂布 to take over. Xun Yu, however, had 
charge of a garrison in Jiyin 濟陰 commandery, and he played a vital role in 
holding a position from which Cao Cao was able to regain his territory. Two 
years later, as Emperor Xian escaped from Chang'an and returned to the east, 
Xun Yu urged Cao Cao to take the exiled ruler under his protection. As the 
emperor was settled at Xu city 許 in Henan, Xun Yu became Director of the 
Imperial Secretariat (尚書令 shangshu ling) at the court of Han. Xu city is 
present-day Xuchang, so Xun Yu had returned to the region of his family's 
old estates. 




 In 199 and 200 Yuan Shao attacked south across the Yellow River and 
Cao Cao set his defences at Guandu 官度 on the Vast Canal 鴻溝. Guarding 
the base at Xu city, Xun Yu maintained the loyalty or neutrality of leaders on 
the south and west and encouraged Cao Cao in the strategy which led to 
victory. 
For the next several years Xun Yu remained at Xu city, formally head of 
the imperial secretariat but in practice responsible for the heart of Cao Cao's 
power. He was consistently a close adviser, and it was under his patronage 
that Cao Cao recruited many of his most effective ministers. Following the 
death of Yuan Shao and the destruction of his sons in Ji province, Xun Yu 
was enfeoffed as a marquis in 206. He rejected additional honours, but Cao 
Cao linked the families by marrying one of his [38] daughters to Xun Yu's 
eldest son Yun 惲. 
 There is no further record of Xun Shen who had served Yuan Shao, but 
another brother, Xun Yan 衍, held command at Ye city in Cao Cao's service, 
and in 205 their cousin Xun Yue, who had followed the imperial court to Xu 
and maintained his position in the Library, submitted Shen jian 神監, a work 
of political philosophy, to the throne. The more distant relative Xun You, 
who had joined Cao Cao in 196 through Xun Yu's recommendation, held 
responsibility and confidence comparable to his: while Xun Yu maintained 
Xu city, Xun You went with Cao Cao on campaign as a tactical adviser and 
occasional commander. 
 By counsel, military activity, or scholarly repute, Xun Yu and his 
kinsmen had moved swiftly, under most troubled conditions, to a national 
role and had acquired a leading position in the new regime: no small 
achievement for a family which had emerged from local obscurity just two 
generations earlier. 
 
The Nine Distinctions 
In 212, however, this close personal and family alliance was disturbed and 
broken, and the source of discord was the question of the Nine Distinctions. 
 The origins of the Nine Distinctions (九錫 jiu xi) were traced to the 
ancient past. Augmentations of honour, they had been used during Former 
Han and were codified into the Confucian tradition of Later Han at a 
conference in the White Tiger Hall at Luoyang held under the auspices of 
Emperor Zhang 章 in 79 AD; a record of the proceedings is preserved in 
Bohu tong 白虎通.9 Details varied slightly from one list to the next, but the 
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recipient [39] was awarded special carriages; clothing, bonnets and shoes of 
honour; musical instruments and formal dancers; a gateway of imperial 
vermilion for his residence; the right to use a private inner staircase at the 
palace; guardsmen of the same style as the ruler's; axes of ceremony and 
authority; ceremonial bows and arrows; and a special liquor distilled from 
black millet and flavoured with herbs. Each entitlement was notionally 
associated with some civil or military achievement, and the special liquor 
was given to those of personal virtue and good conduct. In theory, they could 
be awarded separately, and there were others that a ruler might grant to a 
worthy minister, but tradition, precedent and theory grouped all Nine 
Distinctions into one splendid array. 
 With his triumph at Guandu in 200, followed by the death of Yuan Shao 
two years later, Cao Cao had no effective rival in the north of China. Having 
seized Ji province from Yuan Shao's quarrelling sons, in 207 he destroyed a 
confederation of the Wuhuan 烏桓 people in the north-east and established 
control as far as Manchuria. In 208 he moved south into Jing 荊 province, 
and though he was defeated at the Red Cliffs 赤壁 on the Yangzi by an 
alliance of the warlord Sun Quan and the condottiere Liu Bei 劉備, this was 
not a critical set-back. Another brilliant campaign in 211 destroyed the petty 
chieftains of the north-west and gained the whole of the valley of the Wei. 
There remained three provincial leaders, Liu Bei on the middle Yangzi, Sun 
Quan in the south-east, and Liu Zhang 劉璋 in Yi 益 province, present-day 
Sichuan; but their [40] positions were disparate and their connections 
unstable, so Cao Cao had reason to feel confident that his northern power 
could overwhelm them one by one. 
 In the spring of 212, as he returned from the west to his personal capital 
at Ye city, the imperial court awarded him special honours: the right to enter 
court without announcing himself and without hastening step, and the right 
to wear shoes and carry a sword in the imperial presence. The precedent was 
related to the favour received by Xiao He 蕭何, minister to the founding 
Emperor Gao 高 of Former Han, and the scholar Bao Xian 包咸 former tutor 
to Emperor Ming 明 of Later Han, had been similarly treated. More 
significantly, however, in 145 the powerful regent Liang Ji and in 189 the 
usurping general Dong Zhuo had also taken these privileges.10 
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 In all such cases, however, and particularly the first two, the exemptions 
related to the status of a minister at court, and Cao Cao was treated as no 
more than an especially worthy subject of Han. Ten months later, however, at 
the beginning of winter, a more substantial move was proposed. 
 The initiator was Dong Zhao 董昭 a long-time officer of Cao Cao who 
had served as advisor and planner and was currently a member of his 
Imperial Chancellor's office. Having gathered his forces for another 
campaign against Sun Quan, Cao Cao was moving southeast towards the 
Hual [41] and the enemy position on the lower Yangzi. He would naturally 
pass by Xu city, and Dong Zhao suggested, first, a rearrangement of noble 
ranks to establish the title of Duke and, second, the award of the Nine 
Distinctions.11 
 Since the early years of Han, enfeoffment as King (王 wang) had been 
reserved to members of the imperial clan, and the highest rank available to 
outsiders was Marquis (侯 hou). The feudal rank of Duke (公 gong) was 
maintained for the notional descendants of the ancient dynasties Shang 商 
and Zhou 周, but these had no political role, while the style gong [rendered 
"Excellency" in this context] was also used for the three highest ministers of 
the imperial bureaucracy. 
 Dong Zhao's proposal was that the imperial government should restore 
the feudatory position of Duke above that of the marquises, and that Cao Cao 
should receive the honour to signal his exceptional achievement and 
authority. His recommendation urged that: 
Since ancient times, of all great ministers who have saved the empire, 
never has there been achievement to compare with yours today; and no 
man of the past, with such great work as this, has consented so long to 
serve another. 
Besides his evident flattery, Dong Zhao was addressing two problems of 
protocol and perception. Cao Cao had been awarded four county 
marquisates, but in theory the holder of such fiefs required imperial 
permission not to reside at his domain, and the scholar Kong Rong 孔融 had 
at one time suggested that his continued residence at the capital was lese-
majesty. Kong Rong was a trouble-making pedant, but the incident was 
annoying and embarrassing.12 [42] 
 Two years earlier, in winter at the beginning of 211, Cao Cao had 
addressed the question of his status in an ordinance which formed a personal 
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apologia.13 He referred to his first humble ambitions, to the circumstances 
which had obliged him to contend for power, and to the implications of his 
current situation. His success guaranteed the security of the dynasty, but it 
also exposed him to suspicion that he might aim for the throne himself. 
Supposing I had not been here, who can tell how many men might have 
claimed the imperial title, and how many would have sought to rule as 
kings? 
 There are some people, however, who see how my power has grown 
and realise that I have no natural trust in the favour of Heaven. They are 
afraid I am concerned only for myself, and that I have ambitions for the 
throne. . . . . 
 On the other hand, if anyone proposes that I should simply give up 
my army, hand over my power, and retire to my fief ..., then that is quite 
impossible. Why? Because I am really afraid I should be killed as soon 
as I leave the protection of my troops. And if I should come to harm, ,it 
will not be only my sons and grandsons who suffer – the whole realm 
will be in danger. In seeking a meaningless reputation I would guarantee 
myself a certain death; and I am not going to do this. 
Cao Cao was in an awkward position: he could not afford to look greedy for 
the throne, but he could equally not withdraw from public life,[43] and his 
status as a marquis was unsatisfactory. By Dong Zhao's plan, the system 
would be changed so that he could hold a greater fief and central power 
without obviously infringing the prerogatives of the emperor. Whatever the 
future might hold, Cao Cao would have established himself and his family in 
a position of hereditary power, independent though notionally subordinate to 
the emperor like a Shogun in later Japan. 
 Dong Zhao's proposal was surely presented with Cao Cao's knowledge 
and approval, and in context the Nine Distinctions were no more than an 
embellishment of imperial favour to the substantive matter of the dukedom. 
The precedent, however, was ominous: though Confucian theorists at the 
White Tiger Hall had endorsed the Distinctions as suitable for a loyal 
minister, the only person to whom they had been granted under Han was 
Wang Mang 王莽, just four years before he usurped the throne and 
proclaimed his own dynasty.14 So while the enfeoffment and the Distinctions 
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could be presented as no more than a means to confirm Cao Cao's formal 
position as the greatest subject of Han, they could also be harbingers of a 
future grasp for power and the overthrow of the dynasty. 
 
Fall from grace 
Dong Zhao's proposal was first raised with Cao Cao's military commanders 
and fellow-marquises, who agreed to the enhancement of their master's 
status. Xun Yu, however, approached by letter, raised objections: 
Since the time that Lord Cao raised troops to save the dynasty and give 
peace to the state, he has kept faith with loyalty and honest conduct, and 
has maintained his honour by withdrawing and yielding. A true [44] 
gentleman shows his love for others by virtuous advice, so I must speak 
now. We should not act like this.15 
Xun Yu's biographies emphasise that his advice was sought and given 
privately, but the matter was already known to Cao Cao's officers. It had no 
doubt been planned that a ceremony would be held as Cao Cao passed 
through Xu city on his way to the attack against Sun Quan, but the 
opposition of this respected and senior official of the imperial court brought 
an immediate halt to the program. Cao Cao was naturally embarrassed, and 
when the histories say that he was upset (心不能平), they surely express his 
feelings very mildly. 
 His formal response was prompt. In a memorial to the emperor Cao Cao 
asked that Xun Yu accompany the army to Qiao 譙 "to encourage the 
troops." Qiao county in Pei 沛 was Cao Cao's homeland, and was his base 
for operations against the lower Yangzi. When Xun Yu arrived Cao Cao had 
him transferred to become Palace Attendant (侍中 shizhong), Imperial 
Household Grandee (光祿大夫 guanglu dafu) bearing the Staff of Authority 
(持節 chijie), and Advisor to the Army of the Imperial Chancellor (參丞相軍
事 can chengxiang junshi). The new appointments were announced in most 
complimentary terms, and the first three were indeed fine positions under 
Han: a Palace Attendant held the highest honorific status, Imperial 
Household Grandees were senior advisers, and the Staff of Authority 
conferred plenipotentiary powers. None, however, had the same direct 
influence as head of the imperial secretariat, and the real twist was in the tail, 
for his new post as Adviser to the Army removed Xun Yu from the imperial 
court and placed him directly under Cao Cao's control. [45] 
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 So Xun Yu travelled south-east with Cao Cao's headquarters. In the 
winter, however, he was taken ill at Shouchun, now Shouxian in Anhui, and 
was left behind. The army over-ran Sun Quan's defences north of the Yangzi, 
but could make no gains across the river, and in the spring of 213 Cao Cao 
turned back to the north. By this time Xun Yu was dead. He was fifty years 
old by Chinese reckoning. 
 A variety of stories gathered about Xun Yu's death, depending upon the 
political sympathies of those who told them. Supporters of Cao Cao said that 
he died of natural causes, perhaps aggravated by anxiety about his conflict of 
loyalties. In later years Cao Cao praised him and his cousin Xun You 
together: 
Whenever Xun Wenruo put forward a worthy project, he would follow 
through until it was adopted and completed. The two directors Xun grew 
ever more reliable in their judgement of men. As long as I live I shall 
never forget them.16 
Other accounts, designed to emphasise the rift, tell how Cao Cao, angry and 
resentful, refused to let Xun Yu speak with him privately and later, when he 
was ill, sent a dish of food; but when the lid was taken off the bowl proved to 
be empty. Realising that he had lost Cao Cao's trust, Xun Yu took poison and 
died.17 A further version, brought by a deserter to Sun Quan and widely 
circulated, claimed that Cao Cao had ordered Xun Yu to kill the Empress Fu 
伏; rather than do so, Xun Yu [46] killed himself.18 Certainly, Emperor Xian 
mourned Xun Yu and held ceremonies in his honour, though it is hard to tell 
if this was a general sign of public courtesy to a long-serving officer of the 
court or represented a personal and political alliance.19 
 For there was another, most serious, matter in which Xun Yu may have 
been involved. In 199 Emperor Xian's cousin Dong Cheng 董承 had sought 
to gather a conspiracy against Cao Cao, possibly with the complicity of the 
emperor himself. The plot was discovered and Dong Cheng and his fellows 
were killed, but Cao Cao then also demanded the life of Dong Cheng's 
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daughter, a senior imperial concubine who was pregnant at the time. 
Emperor Xian pleaded for her, but to no avail, and the lady was executed. 20 
 As a result of this, it is said that the Empress Fu became afraid for 
herself, and urged her father Fu Wan 完 to likewise take action against Cao 
Cao. Fu Wan, sensibly, did nothing of the sort, and died peacefully in 209. 
The Lady Fu's initiative was discovered only later, in the winter of 214, and 
Cao Cao promptly sent the Imperial Counsellor Chi Lü 郗慮 and the new 
Director of the Secretariat Hua Xin 華歆 to arrest her. Many of her family 
were killed, including two imperial children, and the Lady died in a palace 
prison. Soon afterwards, Cao Cao arranged for his daughter Jie 節 to be 
raised from senior concubine to imperial consort; one may suspect the 
treachery of the Lady Fu had served his purposes well.21 [47] 
 A further version of the story claims that Xun Yu learnt of the Lady Fu's 
intrigue at an early stage but failed to report it. Much later, when Cao Cao 
taxed him on the matter, he could offer only weak excuses and Cao Cao had 
additional reason to suspect his loyalty. The tale is circumstantial, with 
dialogue between Cao Cao and Xun Yu, but is surely an anachronism, for the 
Lady Fu was not punished until two years after Xun Yu's death, and Cao Cao 
had no reason to wait so long once the affair came to his attention.22 
 What does appear is that the puppet court at Xu city was a potential 
source of trouble, and the emperor himself could be involved in conspiracy 
against his powerful minister. Although he was Cao Cao's chief agent there, 
Xun Yu had been an officer of the court for almost twenty years, and was 
vulnerable to doubts about his loyalty. 
Many men found themselves torn between dynastic and personal allegiances 
at this time of confusion. Besides Kong Rong, who enjoyed maverick 
sophistry and eventually paid the penalty,23  two honorable examples are Han 
Song 韓嵩 and Zhang Hong 張紘. 
 In 199 Liu Biao 劉表, Governor of Jing province, sent his officer Han 
Song to Xu city to assess Cao Cao's chances against Yuan Shao. Han Song 
warned: 
A sage can manage any commission at any time, but a lesser man keeps 
to his duty. Once the name of master and servant has been settled, it 
must be maintained to the death. Now my name is on your service-list, I 
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have handed in my pledge, and you are the only person to command me. 
You may send me through fire and water and I shall die without 
complaint. [48] 
 It is my opinion, however, that Lord Cao will achieve his design for 
the empire. If you wish to support the Son of Heaven above and Lord 
Cao below, then send me to Xu city. If, however, you are uncertain, and 
when I come to the capital the Son of Heaven grants me a post and I am 
obliged to accept, then I shall become an imperial servant, and my 
relationship to you will be no more than that of a former officer. 
 When I have a master I work for him. So if I hold appointment from 
the Son of Heaven I can no longer give you full loyalty. 
Liu Biao paid no attention, and insisted that Han Song go. He was indeed 
given office at the capital, and when he returned he praised Cao Cao's 
government and urged Liu Biao to offer allegiance. Liu Biao, furious, was 
going to kill him for a turn-coat, but Han Song reminded him what he had 
said earlier, and Liu Biao was obliged to accept the principle. Han Song, 
however, was sent to prison, and he was released and rewarded only when 
Cao Cao took over the territory nine years later.24 
 In similar fashion, though less dramatically, the scholar Zhang Hong, a 
long-time supporter of the southern warlord Sun Ce 孫策 was also sent to Xu 
city and held office there. He was an advocate for the Sun family on several 
occasions, and soon after Sun Ce's death in 200 he was sent back to the 
south. Despite his loyal record, he was kept some years at a distance by Sun 
Ce's brother and successor Sun Quan, and probably never gained his full 
confidence.25 
 For Xun Yu at the court in Xu city, the critical decision was whether Cao 
Cao's ambitions and the fortunes of the dynasty could be reconciled; and if 
not, then where did primary loyalty lie? Was his opposition to the Nine 
Distinctions intended to defend the dynasty against further [49] usurpation, 
or was it no more than a well-meant cautionary note, that Cao Cao could not 
afford to appear so ambitious? We cannot assess Xun Yu's full intention, and 
he may not have been clear on the matter himself, but Cao Cao resented his 
support for the imperial court, and was no longer sure of Xun Yu's loyalty. 
Given the tensions within the warlord regime, the potential political damage 
of punishing one of his closest associates, who was also a minister of Han 
and past patron of many of his officers, was too great for Cao Cao to take 
direct action. He made his feelings very clear, however, and though Xun Yu's 
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death was something of an embarrassment and spawned several hostile 
rumours, it did solve the problem. 
 Xun Yu may have died of natural causes, but he may have been 
poisoned, or chose suicide as a means to preserve his family. Certainly the 
affair had no further effect. A few months later Cao Cao took the Nine 
Distinctions and became Duke of Wei, and Xun Yu's cousin Xun You became 
the head of his official secretariat. Xun Yu's eldest son Yun 惲, son-in-law of 
Cao Cao, received the succession to his fief, and his brothers held office at 
court. The Xun, indeed, maintained and enhanced their position under both 
Wei and the successor state of Jin 晉 founded by the Sima 司馬 family, and 
they acquired their highest noble status at the end of the third century.26 
 
The debates of historians 
Given Xun Yu's importance in Cao Cao's government and the suddenness of 
his fall, it is not surprising there were different stories and [50] inter-
pretations of the incident, nor that later writers sought to analyse his conduct 
and motives. At least in early years, however, each commentator was to some 
extent influenced by his situation and experience: the fall of the four-century 
Han empire was unprecedented, and the series of short-lived dynasties which 
followed created their own questions of allegiance. 
 Chen Shou 陳壽 (233-297), compiler of Sanguo zhi, describes Xun Yu 
as dying at Shouchun of illness and anxiety, and in a brief comment at the 
end of the chapter he refers to him as a man who had the talent and skills 
suitable to aid a king, but who failed to fulfill his ambitions. As a former 
official of the defeated state of Shu 蜀 now writing at the court of Jin, Chen 
Shou was unwilling to discuss the full implications of Xun Yu's crisis of 
conscience.27 
 Yuan Hong 袁宏 (328-376), compiler of Hou Han ji 後漢紀, was more 
secure. A respected scholar and writer, he was an associate of the powerful 
Xie 謝 clan of Eastern Jin, and held substantial rank at court and in regional 
government. His account in Hou Han ji of how Xun Yu died of anxiety is 
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followed by a substantial essay on his intentions and achievements. Yuan 
Hong's thesis is that the authority and prestige of Han were not yet 
exhausted, and Cao Cao was simply using them in his struggle for power. By 
helping Cao Cao, therefore, even though he restored good order to the 
empire, Xun Yu failed in his duty of loyalty to the dynasty. On this 
interpretation, Xun Yu was caught by the contradictions of his career. His 
conduct had been unworthy of a true [51] Confucian, and when he was faced 
with the full implications of his support for the usurper, his death came from 
a sense of moral guilt.28 
 Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372-451), compiler of the commentary to Sanguo 
zhi, was a leading official and scholar of the Liu Song 宋 dynasty. An officer 
of Liu Yu 劉裕, general of the Jin dynasty who seized power in 420, he held 
high appointments at court and in the provinces under the new regime, and in 
429 his commentary to Chen Shou's work was accepted by the throne as a 
standard history. Though the work had been formally commissioned in the 
previous year, it was evidently in progress for some time before that.29 Pei 
Songzhi's experience as assistant to a usurping general was analogous to that 
of Xun Yu, but he had no such concerns of conscience, and in commentary to 
Chen Shou's remarks he deliberately confronts the earlier opinion. 
 For Pei Songzhi, there is no question that Xun Yu was aware of Cao 
Cao's ambition, but the Han empire was in such turmoil that a unifying war-
lord was essential. So Xun Yu supported Cao Cao in his struggle to restore 
order. Then, when Cao Cao appeared a threat to the house of Han itself, Xun 
Yu made his protest. His sacrifice gained the dynasty an extension of time, 
and demonstrated his true allegiance. Xun Yu had thus fulfilled his public 
duty by establishing a regime which would aid the people, and he 
demonstrated a sense of personal honour worthy of praise by all who came 
after him.30 [52] 
 Fan Ye 范曄 (398-446), author of Hou Han shu and a younger contemp-
orary to Pei Songzhi, also defends Xun Yu. Noting that previous historians 
categorised him as worthy but of inferior quality, Fan Ye points to his 
excellence as an adviser in time of trouble, but claims he had no intention of 
overthrowing Han. The fall of the dynasty, however, was inevitable and Fan 
Ye, in contradiction to Yuan Hong, argues that Xun Yu was well aware of the 
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consequences of his support for Cao Cao. As to the effect of his work, Fan 
Ye compares Xun Yu to Duanmu Ci 端木賜, the disciple Zigong 子貢 of 
Confucius, whose diplomacy to save the state of Lu 魯 brought turmoil to 
two rival states and power to the semi-barbarous king of Yue 越: he did not 
wish such misfortune, nor did he lack humane feeling, but the situation made 
the results of his work inevitable.31 
 While all agree on his ability and good intentions, therefore, the early 
commentators Chen Shou and Yuan Hong suggest that Xun Yu failed to see 
the consequences of his actions and suffered when faced with them. Pei 
Songzhi, on the other hand, admires him as a man of foresight who accepted 
death for the sake of his personal integrity, and Fan Ye ranks him with the 
disciples of Confucius. Four centuries later, however, Du Mu 杜牧 (807-852) 
returned to the attack with a new charge: Xun Yu was a traitor not to Han but 
to Cao Cao. 
A scholar and writer of the later Tang, Du Mu was noted for his strict 
morality in terms of the revived Confucianism of the time. His collected 
works include poetry, essays, inscriptions and official [53] documents, and 
among them is a short "Note after reading the Biography of Xun Wenruo."32 
The core of the essay is Du Mu's argument that Cao Cao was the only 
man to restore good government after the collapse of Han, and that this is the 
matter of overwhelming importance. Cao Cao may be criticised for the 
killing of the Empress Fu, for the execution of Kong Rong and for other 
cruelties, and such faults disqualify him from comparison with sage rulers of 
the past. Full judgement, however, depends upon circumstance, and Cao 
Cao's real achievement was to save the common people of China from the 
miseries of disorder. 
Du Mu, moreover, cites two occasions that Xun Yu compared Cao Cao 
to legitimate emperors of Han. In 195, during the struggle against Lü Bu for 
Yan province, he argued that the territory was as important to Cao Cao as the 
land within the passes had been for the founding Emperor Gao of Former 
Han or the region about Luoyang for the restoring Emperor Guangwu 光武 
of Later Han.33 And when Cao Cao faced Yuan Shao at Guandu in 200 and 
Xun Yu urged him to hold his line, he described the situation as critical as the 
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long-drawn fighting between Emperor Gao and his rival Xiang Yu 項羽 
about Rongyang 榮陽 on the junction of the Vast Canal and the Yellow 
River.34 Here is evidence that Xun Yu regarded Cao Cao as a man marked for 
empire, but then, observes Du Mu, 
when the affair was ended and the achievement complete, he sought to 
take the credit for the Han dynasty. This is like telling [54] a thief to 
bore through a wall and empty another man's cupboards, but then 
refusing to help him carry away the spoil. Can such a man claim that he 
too is not a robber? 
It was in fact the remnant dynasty which depended upon Cao Cao, not Cao 
Cao who needed the name of Han. Cao Cao could have destroyed his rivals 
without borrowing the prestige of the fallen empire, but Emperor Xian could 
never regain authority on his own. 
 So Xun Yu owed true loyalty to Cao Cao, not only because he had 
personally supported and encouraged him in imperial terms, but also as the 
chief hope for China and its people. It was unworthy and inappropriate for 
him to dither about the rights of Han, and his death was a natural conse-
quence of such mistaken conduct. 
 The debate amongst historians and commentators has thus shifted from 
one perspective to another. Was the dynasty of Han irrevocably ruined? Was 
Cao Cao the only chieftain who could bring order to the empire? Did Xun Yu 
owe loyalty to Cao Cao, to Emperor Xian, or to the Chinese people as a 
whole? And how should an man of honour behave in such a situation? 
 
The teaching of Sima Guang 
Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086), minister of the Northern Song 宋 dynasty, 
presented his plan for a chronicle history, with sample chapters, to Emperor 
Yingzong 英宗 in 1066, and an edict endorsed the proposal. In the following 
year Sima Guang gave a seminar to the new Emperor Shenzong 神宗 who, 
full of admiration, composed a preface for the work and changed the title 
from plain Tongzhi 通志 "Comprehensive Record" to the splendid Zizhi 
tongjian "Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government."35 [55] 
At the same time, Sima Guang was firmly opposed to the liberal policies 
of the emperor and his chief minister Wang Anshi 王安石. Despite the 
imperial patronage and sponsorship, therefore, Sima Guang was kept from 
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any practical position, and Zizhi tongjian was the work of a political exile. 
Soon after the completed history was presented to the throne in 1084, 
however, Emperor Shenzong died, and Sima Guang became chief minister in 
the regency government for the young Emperor Zhezong 哲宗; he spent the 
last eighteen months of his life demolishing the reforms of the previous 
regime. 
His swansong of power, however, had less long-term effect than the 
message which Sima Guang left for his imperial masters and to posterity. For 
Zizhi tongjian, in true Confucian tradition, presents not only a history but 
also a set of moral teachings. 
 One hundred years later the Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 
(1130-1200) prepared an abridgement to the chronicle. [Zizhi] Tongjian 
gangmu 網目 "Summary and Detail of the Comprehensive Mirror" presents 
historical judgements, parallel to the notional system of "praise and blame" 
ascribed to Confucius in his compilation of the Chunqiu 春秋 annals of the 
state of Lu.36 Zhu Xi adds no new material to the original work, but uses it 
rather as a vehicle for presenting his own opinions, and he frequently 
disagrees with Sima Guang. Tongjian gangmu is accessible and has been 
widely influential, but the style is often heavy-handed [56] and Sima Guang's 
approach is more indirect and sophisticated. 
Though closely based upon accounts provided by established texts, the 
account of the fall of Han in Zizhi tongjian carries strong messages: first, 
how the favouritism and folly of emperors Huan and Ling destroyed the 
authority of the dynasty; then how the whirlwind they sowed was reaped in 
civil turmoil after the seizure of power by Dong Zhuo; and finally how Cao 
Cao and his rivals struggled to restore a measure of good order in the 
Chinese world. This is history on a grand scale, and the lessons to be drawn 
from the chronicle are worth any ruler's attention. 
 At a second level, moreover, Sima Guang was concerned with personal 
morality: how should a worthy man behave in critical times? Those who read 
his work not only learn the events of the past, they are given models of 
conduct under stress, to accept, reject, or test against their own. No-one who 
studies Zizhi tongjian in detail can fail to be influenced by the historian's 
strong sense of morality. 
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 Occasionally, however, the chronicler steps outside his self-imposed 
restrictions to address the reader directly. In short essays prefixed by the 
phrase "Your servant [Sima] Guang remarks" (臣光曰) he presents his own 
interpretation of the events he has described. He does not do this often, but 
the effect of his comments is all the more powerful for their rarity. 
 In the case of Xun Yu and Cao Cao, Sima Guang felt obliged to enter the 
debate in this way, specifically to defend Xun Yu against the claim that he 
lacked Confucian virtue. His argument is based upon a comparison with the 
legendary minister Guan Zhong 管仲 or Guanzi 管子, who served Duke 
Huan of Qi 齊桓公 during the seventh century BC [57] and brought him to 
hegemony over his rival feudatories under the weakened kingdom of Zhou 
周.37 
Confucius described love for humanity (仁 ren) as the matter of utmost 
importance. From ... the highest of his followers, to the ... worthy 
grandees of the feudal lords, none qualified for that description. Only 
Guan Zhong did he praise for humanity, and surely this was because 
Guan Zhong, assistant to Duke Huan of Qi, gave such great relief to 
living people. 
The conduct of Duke Huan of Qi was like that of a dog or a pig, yet 
Guan Zhong was not ashamed to act as his Chancellor. It is obvious that 
he saw Duke Huan as the only way to bring aid to the people. 
In the great disorders at the end of Han, the people were in utmost 
misery, and only a man of exceptional ability could bring them help. 
Had Xun Yu left Emperor Wu of Wei 魏武帝 [Cao Cao],38 whom should 
he have served? 
In the time of Duke Huan of Qi, though the house of Zhou was 
weak, the position was still not so bad as the situation of Han at the 
beginning of the Jian'an 建安 period [in 196]. At that time the whole 
world was in turmoil and overturned, and the Han had not a foot of 
ground nor a single man under its command. 
Xun Yu assisted Wu of Wei to bring about a restoration. He 
promoted worthy men and gave work to the able, he trained soldiers and 
he drilled troops, he seized opportunities and he developed plans, he 
fought and was successful in every direction, [58] and so he was able to 
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turn weak into strong and change disorder into good government. Of the 
ten parts of the empire the Wei had eight. 
 In what respect does the achievement of Xun Yu fall short of that of 
Guan Zhong? Guan Zhong did not die for Gongzi Jiu 公子糾,39 but Xun 
Yu died for the house of Han. His sense of humanity was superior to that 
of Guan Zhong. 
So Sima Guang gives first emphasis to the responsibility of a minister 
towards the people as a whole, regardless of the qualities of the ruler, and he 
cites Confucius' praise of Guan Zhong for his practical public achievement, 
regardless of his personal obligations. 
He then addresses the criticisms of Du Mu, firstly that Xun Yu had 
compared Cao Cao to the founding emperors of Han, but then turned away 
and sought to make him, despite his achievements, merely a servant of the 
Han. 
 To the first accusation, Sima Guang simply rejects the records of the 
history: 
I recall Confucius' saying: "Literature over reality, that is a scribe."40 
Whenever an historian records a man's words, he always [59] adds a 
literary touch. So the comparison of Wu of Wei with Gaozu 高祖 
[Emperor Gao]41 and with Guangwu..., that is no more than embellish-
ment by some historian. How can we know Xun Yu really spoke that 
way? This is criticising him for a fault which is not his. 
In other words, though Xun Yu's words to Cao Cao on two occasions are 
recorded in three separate texts, and the second piece of advice was given in 
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a letter which may well have entered the archives of Wei, Sima Guang is 
prepared to deny the evidence. 
 To the second charge, that Xun Yu turned from Cao Cao to Han, Sima 
Guang returns to the essential argument of Pei Songzhi: 
Moreover, if Wu of Wei had become emperor, then Xun Yu would have 
received much of the credit for bringing it about, and could expect the 
same rewards as Xiao He received from Emperor Gao. Xun Yu, 
however, took no advantage from his situation. On the contrary, he was 
prepared to give his own life in order that Han might receive the benefit. 
Surely this is exceptional conduct? 
One may have the feeling that Sima Guang is over-emphasising his point, 
and that in defending or denying Xun Yu's comparison of Cao Cao with the 
founders of Han, he makes the same error he ascribes to others. Certainly we 
cannot be sure that Xun Yu spoke as he is recorded, but the evidence in the 
opposite direction, presenting Xun Yu as a martyr to the ideal cause of the 
dynasty, is equally suspect. 
 Ultimately, we may recognise Xun Yu as the clever counsellor to a great 
warlord. We cannot judge his full intentions; nor, as with any human being, 
can we be sure he acted always with consistent motives. His relations with 
his imperial masters, however, and the stories which were told about the 
manner of his death, presented a problem for later historians and 
commentators, and their debates expressed the tensions of a philosophical 
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